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WRONGFUL LIFE AND A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE
BORN HEALTHY: PARK v. CHESSIN;
BECKER v. SCHWARTZ
Two recent cases in the New York Appellate Division are the
first appellate level decisions in New York, and apparently in any
American jurisdiction, to recognize an infant's claim for wrongful
life.1 At issue is whether an infant born with severe birth defects has
a remedy against physicians who "caused" the birth by failing to in-
form the parents of a medically ascertainable risk of deformities, thus
preventing the parents from deciding not to have the child. Most juris-
dictions have only recently recognized a cause of action for parents in
this situation, but have limited their recovery to reimbursement of
out-of-pocket expenses.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUES
Changing conceptions of risk, advances in medical science and
technology, and changes in the legal and social environment of birth
control have resulted in an increasing number of "wrongful life"
claims.2 The rubric has been used to describe three lines of cases, al-
l. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1977); Park
v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977), modifying 88 Misc. 2d
222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal
for these cases on February 27, 1978. Argument was scheduled for November 27, 1978.
2. In exploring the history of wrongful life cases, one commentator attributed
these claims to changing attitudes toward risk:
The many ills to which man is heir were formerly considered matters
of fate and not legally remediable. . . . Today . . . we are not reconciled
to their consequences but seek to pass them on to others. This is due to con-
ditions of economic prosperity in society, to political circumstances ... perhaps
even a philosophical approach different from those of the past. . . . In cases
where circumstances do not allow the blame to be attached to any particular
person, the victim endeavors to cast the burden on society ....
Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life" 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 516 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
More pertinent to the recent incidence of the birth defects line of wrongful life
cases is the observation that:
Recent medical and legal developments . . . have given parents new options
aimed at avoiding the tragedy of bearing genetically defective children. These
developments include: (1) increased understanding of the causes of genetic
defects; (2) numerous advances in techniques for identifying those persons
who are "carriers" of genetic defects and for diagnosing genetic defects in
the fetus; and (3) growing legal acceptance of birth prevention ....
Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 AM. J. L. &
ME.% 333, 333-34 (1977).
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though courts have not always recognized the factual distinctions
among them. The earliest use of the term arose in suits by illegitimate
children against parents,3 or the state,4 for damages to compensate
them for their "wrongful life" or wrongful social status. In general,
these plaintiffs did not allege that they would have preferred not to
have been born, and wrongful status is a more appropriate label for
these cases. No court has recognized this cause of action on behalf of
an illegitimate child. 5
Courts have also used "wrongful life" to describe "wrongful con-
ception ' 6 claims against medical personnel when a birth results from
the failure of some method of contraception. Although older decisions
refused to recognize wrongful conception situations as a valid basis for
an award of damages for either parents or child,7 recent cases in New
York," and other jurisdictions have recognized claims by parents. 10
3. See, e.g., Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. App. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1974); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App.
2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Slawek v. Stroh,
62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
4. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
5. See 22 A.L.R. 3d 1441 (1968); notes 3-4 supra.
6.
It is suggested that the phrase "wrongful conception" be used to denominate
the cause of action in the unsuccessful sterilization and contraception cases,
for it is at the instant of conception that the damage occurs. After all,
it is for the purpose of preventing conception that . .. contraception is prac-
ticed, so, when . . . a child is nevertheless conceived, there is cause for
complaint.
Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MiAux L. REv. 1409,
1430 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934);
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957).
8. See Chapman v. Schultz, 47 A.D.2d 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (4th Dep't 1975)
(mem.); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (4th Dep't 1975).
In Ziemba, the parents claimed for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium and child support as damages resulting from a negligent failure to diagnose the
pregnancy. The court refused to dismiss the complaint, stating that:
The action is basically one for malpractice, which has long been recognized
as the appropriate remedy by which recovery may be had for damages sus-
tained as a result of a physician's failure to exercise ordinary and reasonable
care in diagnosis or treatment .... "[T]he person responsible must respond for
all damages resulting directly from and as a natural consequence of the wrong-
ful act. .. "
Id. at 231, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68 (citations omitted). See also Cox v. Stretton, 77
Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974) (negligent vasectomy; parents were entitled
to "such damages as they may properly prove." Id. at 161, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 842). But
see Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977) (negligent tubal ligation,
mother and child's claims dismissed).
9. For example, in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr 652
(1976), the court reversed a judgment of nonsuit for the mother's claims based on a
negligent abortion, stating that the mother "should be permitted to recover all the
damages to which she is entitled under ordinary tort principles." Id. at 709, 127 Cal.
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Most jurisdictions, including New York, allow the parents to re-
cover all damages proximately resulting from a wrongful conception.
Elements of damage in these states may include recovery of the cost
of the operation, medical expenses attendant to the pregnancy, physi-
cal and mental pain and suffering, lost wages, loss of consortium, child
support, and perhaps even compensation to siblings for deprivation of
parental care.1 Other jurisdictions have limited recovery to pecuniary
losses resulting from the pregnancy,' 2 and have refused to award child
support.13 No reported case has awarded damages to a healthy child
who is the result of the wrongful conception.14
Rptr. at 658-59. However, the court affirmed the judgment of nonsuit for the infant
plaintiff's claims for lack of a "compensable injury," id. at 707, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 657,
noting that "[tJhe issue involved is more theological or philosophical than legal." Id.
at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 666. General demurrers to a claim of negligent sterilization
were overruled in Custudio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
The court found that the parents' damages could include recovery for the unsuccessful
sterilization, medical expenses of the pregnancy, physical and mental pain and suffering,
loss of consortium, child support, and compensation to other children for deprivation
of support, if economically measurable. In Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the court held that an action will lie for parents' claims iesulting
from the birth of an unplanned child following a negligent sterilization; damages were
a question for the jury. In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971), the plaintiff parents alleged that their pharmacist negligently dispensed con-
traceptives, causing the birth of an additional child. The court recognized their claim:
"Inhere is no valid reason why the trier of fact should not be free to assess damages
as it would in any other negligence case." Id. at 252, 187 N.W.2d at 516. The elements
of damage could include medical and hospital expenses, child support, the mother's lost
wages and her pain and suffering. In Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d
336 (1975), damages were measured by a comparison of the plaintiff parents' position
before and after the negligently performed tubal ligation; any damages proximately
resulting from the operation, "including the costs, emotional upset and the physical in-
convenience of rearing a child may be recovered at law." Id. at 77, 334 A.2d at 340.
But see Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(negligent failure to diagnose pregnancy-no cause of action).
10. Some courts have adopted the terms "wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful
birth" to distinguish,.the parents' claims from the "wrongful life" claim of the infant in
wrongful conception suits. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974). Unfortunately, other courts use the terms wrongful life and wrongful birth inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); 22 A.L.R. 3d
1441 (1968). See generally 47 TUL. L. Rav. 492, 493 (1972); 3 SETON HALL L. RnV.
492, 493 (1972).
11. See notes 8-9 supra.
12. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), modified
and remanded, 298 A.2d 320 (Del. 1972), modified, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974) (damages limited to mother's pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and medical
costs stemming from negligent sterilization); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1973) (no recovery for care and maintenance of child).
13. See generally Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 707-09, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652, 657-58 (1976).
14. 27 A.L.R. 3d 906; see notes 7-12 supra. See generally Kashi, supra note 6;
Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth of an Unplanned Child,
39 ALB. L. Rav. 221 (1975); Comment, Liability for the Failure of Birth Control
Methods, 76 COL. L. Rav. 1187 (1976).
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The most recent developments have occurred in situations where
children are born with severe mental or physical defects that could
have been detected before birth by the proper exercise of medical ex-
pertise.15 The defendant's conduct, whether misfeasance or nonfeas-
ance, is not the cause of the harm in a scientific sense of cause and
effect relationship; 16 the claim is that the tortious act of failing to in-
form the parents of the potential of deformities proximately caused
harm to parents and child by abrogating the parents' right to prevent
the birth.' 7 While the parents' claims are essentially in malpractice for
breach of a professional standard of care, suits by infant plaintiffs pre-
sent novel conceptual problems. The infant's derivative action for
damages also rests upon the assumption that if the parents had been
properly informed, they would have chosen not to have a child with
debilitating defects. Thus the plaintiffs cannot claim that the infant
would have been a healthy child but for the tortious acts of the de-
fendant; they must allege instead that the defendant's negligence has
resulted in the birth of an infant who should not have been born.
This note will use the term wrongful life to describe only this last
group of factual situations.' 8
Although early wrongful life cases dismissed both parents' and
15. The techniques of amniocentesis and ultrasound scanning are the most com-
mon methods of detecting prenatal defects. Genetic counseling can provide information
on potential defects before conception. See generally A. MILUNSKY, THE PRENATAL
DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY DISORDERS (1973); Shaw, supra note 2, at 335; Milunsky
& Reilly, The "New" Genetics: Emerging Medicolegal Issues in the Prenatal Diagnosis
of Hereditary Disorders, 1 Am. J. L. & MED. 71, 79-82 (1975).
16. Cases where the defendant has directly caused the infant's condition, referred
to as preconception or prenatal torts, are markedly different from the wrongful life
situation, and courts have not had much difficulty in fitting them into traditional tort
theory. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953); Shack v.
Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1976). See also note 124 infra.
17. Parental decisions regarding procreation and raising children are constitution-
ally protected as a fundamental liberty, or are within the zone of interests encompassed
by the right of privacy. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1932); Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18.
The true "wrongful life" case arises when a physician negligently fails to
apprise a pregnant woman of the probability of unavoidable birth defects in
time to abort the fetus. Only recently have the courts begun to recognize a
right of action in parents . . . for the recovery of medical expenses attendant
to raising the child. No case has awarded damages to the child himself . . .
this is a clear case of a meritorious cause of action being denied because of
its ill-chosen label.
Kashi, supra note 6, at 1431-32 (footnotes omitted).
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infants' claims,"" recent decisions have recognized a difference between
the plaintiffs: The trend is to allow the parents to recover proven
pecuniary damages, while prior to the Park and Becker decisions, the
infant's claim has invariably been dismissed.2 0 However, distinctions
between the types of plaintiff in the wrongful life situation are arti-
ficial to some degree. The infant plaintiff's damages are necessarily
incident to the tortious frustration of the parents' rights, and for pur-
poses of compensation the family should be considered a single eco-
nomic unit. While the infant plaintiff pursues a theory of re-
covery conceptually different from that of his parents, it is more
logical to analyze treatment of the elements of damage in these cases
than -to distinguish between the two types of plaintiffs. Although no
case seeking recovery for the infant's costs on his own behalf has yet
arisen, the treatment of the parents' claims for expenses suggests that
a claim for this type of damage by an infant plaintiff would also be
recognized if the infant could prove such expenditures.
Courts have raised both legal and philosophical objections to
wrongful life claims. The most persistent barriers concern the evalua-
tion of damages. Under any theory of recovery, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury,21 and must furnish
some framework for calculating a compensatory award.2 2 While a claim
for medical costs and related expenses satisfies these criteria, courts
still refuse to allow the parents compensation for mental distress, gen-
erally on the grounds that they are unduly speculative. The infant
plaintiff encounters difficulty with both requirements, although some
courts seem to confuse the policy evaluations inherent in determining
whether the infant has suffered a legally cognizable damage with the
secondary problem of assessing the extent of the injury.2-
19. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d
531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d
616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972). "The cause of action asserted by the parents, like that
of the child, is one not previously known to the law. As such, it should await legislative
sanction and should not be accepted by judicial fiat." 35 A.D.2d at 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d
at 503.
20. See Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (4th Dep't 1977);
Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.
2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d
41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
21. D. DoBns, REmEDIES §§ 3.1, 3.3 (1973); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 30 (4th ed.
1971).
22. D. DOBBS, supra note 21, §§ 3.2, 3.3, 8; J. FUCHSBERG, N.Y. DAMAGES LAw
§ 1037 (1965).
23. Compare Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (2d
1978]
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The concept of life as a blessing is deeply rooted in legal thought,
and as a matter of policy courts have been reluctant to hold that the
creation of life can result in a legally compensable injury. An early
wrongful conception case relied upon the perception that "to allow
damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the
universal public sentiment of the people" 24 in refusing to recognize the
parents' claim for damages. Other courts extended this reasoning to
situations where the infant is born with severe deformities, finding
it impossible to determine whether the mental anguish suffered by the
parents was outweighed by the benefits of parenthood, therefore hold-
ing it impossible to establish damages as a matter of law.- The more
recent decisions have not applied this benefits rule to pecuniary ele-
ments of damage, but similar reasoning is used in refusing to recog-
nize other elements of damage claimed by parents.
The infant plaintiff's paradox is that the act which "caused" his
birth with deformities is the same act responsible for his birth. Courts
still refuse to find that the birth of a severely deformed child has re-
sulted in an injury or loss to that child. Usurpation of legislative func-
tions, lack of precedent, and unlimited liability arguments are recur-
rent themes in wrongful life cases, but the underlying problem is a
conflict with the common-law tradition: "[A] plaintiff has no remedy
against a defendant whose offense is that he failed to consign the plain-
tiff to oblivion. Such a cause of action is alien to our system of juris-
prudence."2
6
A narrower legal formulation of the same question is the problem
of assessing the extent of the infant plaintiff's damages. Damages are
compensatory, and the usual method of calculation attempts to make
good the plaintiff's loss by a comparison of the plaintiff's situation be-
fore and after the tortious act.27 In the wrongful life situation, the
requisite comparison between nonexistence and life with severe physi-
cal or mental handicaps is one that the courts have repeatedly refused
to perform. As stated by the plurality in a seminal New Jersey case,
Gleitman v. Cosgrove:
The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between
his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is
Dep't 1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) with
Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 80-81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (4th Dcp't 1977).
24. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957).
25. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
26. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 436, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41,
46 (1968).
27. D. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 1.1; Tedeschi, supra note 2, at 529.
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impossible to make such a determination. This court cannot weigh
the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life
itself. By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant
plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his al-
leged damages because of the impossibility of making the compari-
son required by compensatory remedies.
2 8
However, most recent commentaries29 and a significant number of
dissenting judges30 have objected to the majority position-that, as a
matter of law, no possible circumstances of birth could resuk in a
legally compensable injury to the child, regardless of the degree of the
defendant's fault-and have suggested that the courts should fashion
a remedy for the infant. Furthermore, judicial limitation of the
parents' recovery to out-of-pocket expenses has been criticized as pro-
viding inadequate compensation for wrongful life plaintiffs, and has
contributed to dissatisfaction with the present rule.
II. RECENT NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION CASES
A. Park v. Chessin
In June, 1969, Hetty Park delivered an infant who died of poly-
cystic kidney disease five hours after birth. According to the complaint,
the parents then sought counseling from their obstretricians regarding
the potential risk to subsequent children. The defendants did not
inform the parents that the disease was hereditary and assured them
that the risk to future children was practically nonexistent. 31 Relying
on this advice, Mrs. Park became pregnant and delivered Lara Park
in July, 1970. Lara was also born with polycystic kidneys and sur-
vived about thirty months.
The Parks brought suit on their own behalf and as executors of
Lara's estate for various damages in malpractice and fraud. The su-
preme court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part, pre-
serving the infant's claim for conscious pain and suffering, the mother's
claims for physical pain and suffering and mental distress, and the
father's causes of action for loss of his wife's services and for expenses
28. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
29. For example, Professor Dobbs found the result in Gleitman "astonishing," D.
DOBBS, supra note 21, at 182. See also Kashi, supra note 6; 13 WAxE FOREST L. REv.
712 (1977).
30. See notes 19-20 supra.
31. See, e.g., Simon & Thompson, Congenital Renal Polycystic Disease, 159 J.A.M.A.
657 (1955). Polycystic kidneys can occur in infants in two forms: an "adult type,"
which is autosomal dominant (at least 50% risk to subsequent child), and an "infantile
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resulting from the alleged malpractice. 32 Defendants appealed, and a
majority in the Appellate Division, Second Department, modified and
affirmed, dismissing only the mother's claim for mental distress. 83
B. Becker v. Schwartz
Barbara Becker was born with physical and mental defects caused
by Down's Syndrome in May, 1975. Plaintiffs alleged that their obste-
tricians were negligent in their prenatal treatment of Mrs. Becker.
They knew that Mrs. Becker was thirty-seven years old and that the
incidence of mongolism increased with increasing maternal age, yet
did not inform the Beckers of the increased risk, ox of the widespread
availability of an amniocentesis test that could have determined that
their child would be afflicted.3 4
Plaintiffs sought damages for Mrs. Becker's emotional distress,
the father's expenses for care of the infant and loss of consortium, and
the infant's pain and suffering.35 The supreme court dismissed the
entire complaint for failure to state a cause of action.30 In a brief
opinion, citing only Park v. Chessin as authority, the second depart-
ment modified, preserving the parents' claim for expenses and the
infant's claim for pain and sufferingY
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The New York Court of Appeals has not ruled on an infant's
wrongful life claim since 1972, when it denied both mother and child's
type" which is thought to be autosomal recessive (variable but less than 25% chance
of recurrence in later children). Crocker, Polycystic Kidney Disease in PEDIATRIC
NEPHROLOGY 360, 363 (M. Rubin & T. Barratt, eds. 1975). Afflicted infants are
generally stillborn, but may survive for a few years. H. E. DE WARDENER, THE KIDNEY
402 (4th ed. 1973). The cause of death is renal failure, and there is neither a cure
nor a treatment: "The management plan in polycystic disease, as in other diseases of
genetic origin, should include counseling of the parents regarding the risk to future
children." J. JAmEs, RENAL DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 106 (3d ed. 1976).
32. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co.
1976).
33. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). Justice Cohalan, con-
curring in part, recognized only the infant's claim for pain and suffering and the
father's claim for expenses incurred. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115. Justice Titone's
lengthy dissent opposed the recognition of all the claims. Id.
34. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1977), Record
on Appeal 40.
35. Id. at 16-17, 63.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1977).
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claims in Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital,3 8 a case that arose
before New York liberalized its abortion law. 39 The mother had con-
tracted rubella during her pregnancy and sought the defendant's ad-
vice about an abortion. The hospital's abortion committee split evenly
on whether an abortion was necessary, but informed Mrs. Stewart that
she did not need an abortion, and advised her not to seek an abortion
elsewhere.40 Mrs. Stewart's daughter was born with congenital defects
caused by the rubella. A jury granted verdicts for mother and daughter,
but the trial court set aside the verdict for the infant, holding that the
infant could not establish damages.41 The appellate division reversed
the mother's verdict, apparently because, under the prior abortion
statute, the hospital was not obligated either to perform a eugenic
abortion or to inform the mother that two members of the committee
thought that the infant would be born with deformities. 42 The court
of appeals affirmed as modified in a brief memorandum opinion.43
In 1977, the court of appeals held that the parents of a child born
with deformities could not recover emotional distress damages against
their obstetricians. The complaint did not ask for damages on the in-
fant's behalf. In Howard v. Lecher, the parents alleged that the
defendants had negligently failed to recognize and warn them of the
risk of Tay-Sachs disease, and to inform them that tests could deter-
mine whether the fetus was afflicted. The trial court denied motions
to dismiss the parents' claims for expenses and emotional distress
damages. The defendants appealed only the claims for mental pain
and suffering. The second department dismissed the claims, holding
that the parents did not suffer the requisite direct injury for an award
38. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1970), af'd as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
39. N.Y. PBNAL LAw § 125.05 (McKinney 1976) took effect on July 1, 1970. Mrs.
Stewart sought her abortion in 1964.
40. 58 Misc: 2d at 433, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
41. The court noted that the alleged negligence did not cause the infant's condi-
tion, that the hospital was justified in refusing to perform the abortion, and that the
infant's cause of action was not cognizable at law. However, "Mrs. Stewart was entitled
to know that two doctors did not agree with [the decision not to abort] .... " Id. at
438-39, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
42. The second department also felt that an evaluation of the mother's damages
was virtually impossible because of the difficulty in weighing the mother's anguish against
the benefits of parenthood. 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502.
43. 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (mem.).
44. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (197-7) (4-3 decision),
aff'g 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1976). "
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of mental distress damages, 45 and also discussed the elements of duty0
and damages4 7 as additional justifications for the result. The dissent
indicated that the majority's preoccupation with wrongful life, not
at issue given the absence of an infant plaintiff and the measure of
damages claimed, obscured a traditional malpractice claim that should
have been evaluated by 'the trier of fact.
The court of appeals majority realized that the issue was not a
wrongful life claim,48 but held that public policy required that the
45.
[T]he injury from which their alleged emotional harm stemmed was suffered
by the child. The risk of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones
is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or another.... This is the risk
of living and bearing children.
53 A.D.2d at 423, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
46. The appellate division majority thought that recognizing the claims for emo-
tional harm in this non-feasance situation would result in a "dangerous extension of
malpractice liability" by imposing on doctors "an absolute duty to conduct an exhaustive
genealogical profile of both parents in order for him to counsel them as to the wisdom
of the wife obtaining an abortion." Id. at 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462. This position is
equivalent to finding no duty to investigate genetic factors as a matter of law, and was
criticized by the Park trial court and in the court of appeals dissent:
The day has not come when public policy has foreclosed the maintenance
of malpractice actions. To be sure, as noted by two recent commentators 'The
Courts would be indulging in a dangerous precedent if they provide a blanket
immunization for physicians in the case of their failure to advise parents of the
prospects of giving birth to a deformed child. The burden on the medical pro-
fession . . . is not any more unreasonable than the burden placed upon physi-
cians to use reasonable care in delivering a child or informing patients of the
risk of surgical procedures.
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d at 117, 366 N.E.2d at 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 358 (quoting
Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 1976 Survey of New York Law, 28 SYRACUS. L. Rrv. 525,
564 (1977)).
47.
When the parents say that the child should not have been born, they make it
impossible for a court to measure their damages in being the mother and
father of a defective child. . . . [I]t is virtually impossible to evaluate as
compensatory damages the anguish to the parents of rearing either a malformed
child, or a child born with fatal disease, as against the denial to them of
the benefits of parenthood. Damages which are uncertain, contingent or
speculative in their nature cannot be made the basis for a recovery.
53 A.D.2d at 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (citations omitted). The argument that the
offsetting benefits of parenthood operate to make damages too speculative and thus act
to bar recovery as a matter of law was also raised by the Park dissent and by the second
department in Stewart. See note 42 supra. The same argument was also used in the
early wrongful conception cases to deny recovery to the parents, and has since been
discredited in most jurisdictions, including New York, although the court of appeals
has not passed on this question. See notes 8, 9, 12 & 14 supra. See generally D. DoDns,
supra note 21, § 3.6. However, the benefits of parenthood, assuming that they exist,
presumably should be considered in evaluating the damages: "Where the defendant's
tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing
has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is
equitable." RESTATEMIENT OF TORTS, § 920 (1939).
48. 42 N.Y.2d at 112, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
[Vol. 27
WRONGFUL LIFE
parents' claims be dismissed:
There can be no doubt that the plaintiffs have suffered and the
temptation is great to offer them some form of relief. Ideally, there
should be a remedy for every wrong. This is not the function of the
law, however, for "[e]very injury has ramifying consequences ....
The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs
to a controllable degree."
49
The majority relied upon Tobin v. Grossman5" where the plaintiff
mother sought to recover for physical and mental injuries allegedly
caused by witnessing her child being struck by a car. The court of
appeals, concerned with the specter of boundless liability, found that
the mother did not suffer "direct injury" and denied recovery.
A vigorous dissent refused to accept the characterization of the
Howards as bystanders at the accidental birth of their child and relied
instead upon Johnson v. State,51 where the daughter of a woman con-
fined to a state institution was incorrectly notified that her mother had
died. The Johnson court allowed an award for emotional suffering,
holding that the plaintiff had been "directly" harmed by the breach
of duty. In Howard, the duties inherent in the doctor-patient relation-
ship negated -fears of unlimited liability, since harm to the mother and
child was a clearly foreseeable result of the alleged negligence. Three
judges would have recognized the emotional distress claim, stating
that "logic and justice" required that all proven harms proximately
resulting from the tort be compensated: "The day has not come when
public policy has foreclosed the maintenance of malpractice actions.
52
Although the court of appeals has not passed on an infant's claim
since Stewart,53 or defined the proper elements of damage for the
parents in a wrongful life situation, a recent fourth department hold-
ing presents an interesting contrast to the Park and Becker decisions.
Karlsons v. Guerinot54 treated both infant's and parents' claims in a
situation virtually identical to those alleged in Howard v. Lecher and
49. Id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (quoting Tobin v. Gross-
man, 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561).
50. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
51. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
52. 42 N.Y.2d at 117, 366 N.E.2d at 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
53. There was no infant plaintiff in Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d .420, 386
N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1977), or in Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977). The court decided the narrow issue that the accepted medical
practice at the time did not require the use of the tests which allegedly would have
revealed that the baby would be born with genetic defects.
54. 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (4thDep't 1977).
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Becker v. Schwartz.5  The Karlsons majority recognized the parents'
action for mental distress:
56
[T]he pain, suffering and mental anguish suffered by the plaintiffs
as a result of the birth of their mongoloid child is the type of direct
injury flowing from defendant's alleged breach of duty to the parents
that was contemplated by the Court of Appeals in Johnson ....
Inasmuch as the plaintiffs' injuries were directly caused by defen-
dant's alleged breach of duty, it follows that damages are recoverable
for their resulting pain, suffering and mental anguish. 7
Having determined that these damages were legally cognizable, the
court noted that "difficulty in the estimation of a monetary value
should not constitute a barrier to the plaintiffs' recovery .... Calcula-
tions of this nature are not alien to our judicial system and jurors are
called on to make this determination quite often."58s
However, the Karlsons court unanimously held that judicial recog-
nition of the infant's claim was impossible because the infant could
not establish that he had suffered an injury, and thus could not prove
damages.59 The majority would not consider the threshold question
of whether life with deformities was worse than the utter void of non-
existence: "Such a decision, by the very nature of the concepts sought
to be compared and their far-reaching implications, is beyond the scope
of judicial decision-making and must await legislative action."'00
A number of other jurisdictions have recently passed on wrongful
life claims and have allowed recovery only for the parents' expenses.
55. The Karlsons alleged that although the defendant obstetricians knew that the
mother suffered from a thyroid condition, had previously given birth to a child with an
orthopedic defect, and was of such age that the risk of Down's Syndrome was significantly
higher than usual, the doctors failed to advise them of the potential of a deformed
child or of the availability of the amniocentesis test that could have detected Down's
Syndrome in the fetus. Record on Appeal at 4-7. The trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing claims for mental distress, loss of
the child's services, and the infant's claim, but preserved the father's claim for medical
expenses. Id. at 92-97 (Wagner, J., Sup. Ct., Monroe Co., Jan. 6, 1977).
56. Karlsons was decided before the court of appeals heard arguments on Howard
v. Lecher. Justices Carmadone and Dillon, dissenting in part, would have dismissed the
emotional distress claims. 57 A.D.2d 73, 84, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 940.
57. Id. at 78, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37.
58. Id. at 78-79, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
59. The court noted that its objection was not whether the jury could arrive at a
figure for an award:
The existence of any injury or damage in a qualitative sense is an entirely
different question from whether such damages may be properly measured in
monetary figures. The latter is solely a question of fact for a jury and once
damages are found to exist mere difficulties in estimating their extent and
value would not bar recovery.
Id. at 80-81, note 3, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 938, note 3 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 81, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
WRONGFUL LIFE
In the 1975 Texas case of Jacobs v. Theimer,61 the parents of an infant
born with deformities caused by maternal rubella sued for past and
future medical expenses and emotional suffering allegedly resulting
from their obstetrician's negligent failure to diagnose the rubella.62
The Texas Supreme Court held that the parents could recover the
"expenses reasonably necessary for the care and treatment of their
child's physical impairment. . ."3, but thought that the parents' dam-
ages for emotional suffering were too speculative to permit recovery.6
In Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,65 another case alleging negligent
diagnosis of maternal rubella, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin dis-
missed an infant's claim because her damages were impossible to
evaluate, 66 but recognized the parent's cause of action for the "addi-
tional medical, hospital and supportive expense occasioned by the
deformities of the child as contrasted to a normal, healthy child." 67
Bowman v. Davis68 was both a wrongful life and wrongful conception
suit. Ten months after Mrs. Bowman underwent a "tubal ligation,"
she gave premature birth to twins, one healthy, and one afflicted with
physical and mental deformities. The parents claimed damages for
medical expenses, pain and suffering, the costs of rearing the twins,
and loss of consortium. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a verdict
of $462,500.
IV. ANALYSIS OF PARK AND BECKER
A. The Parents' Claims
1. Medical Expenses, Physical Injuries and Lost Services. Park
held that the parents' claims, except for emotional distress damages,
were valid causes of action under a theory of negligent misrepresenta-
61. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
62. Although eugenic abortions were illegal under Texas law at the time, the
court ignored this potential obstacle and based its holding on the parents' right to
information regarding the infant's condition. 519 S.W.2d at 848-49.
63. Id. at 850.
64. The court relied on Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)
to support this position, and this reasoning has been criticized. See, e.g., Kass & Shaw,
The Risk of Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and the Parents' Right to Know, 2 Al.
J. L. & Man., 213, 234-41 (1976). In the context of the entire opinion, the result for
this claim is based more on a policy of limiting liability than upon the articulated
rationale.
65. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
66. Id. at 773, 233 N.W.2d at 376.
67. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
68. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
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tion.69 The Parks alleged that they requested a medical opinion on the
probability of a specific genetic disease in a situation where reliance
on the medical knowledge of the defendants was unequivocally fore-
seeable. According to the complaint, the incorrect advice tendered by
the defendants was a breach of a professional duty of care, which
proximately caused their damages.70 The majority emphasized the
dichotomy between the misfeasance alleged in Park and the nonfeas-
ance complained of in prior wrongful life cases: "Plaintiffs do not rest
on what the defendant doctors should have done, notwithstanding a
failure to actually request i.t. ' ' 71 In contrast to Howard, where the
second department questioned the existence of an affirmative duty to
investigate the genetic history of prospective parents, 72 the duty owed
to the Parks was widely recognized in tort:
[O]ne may not speak without prudence or due care when one has a
duty to speak, knows that the other party intends to rely on what is
imparted, and does, in fact, so rely to his detriment. The injuries that
flow therefrom include the economic injuries represented by provable
medical and support expenses incurred during the lifetime of the
child!
3
Other damages recognized by the court because they "ordinarily flow
from the tort" were Mrs. Park's claim for physical pain and suffering
and Mr. Park's claim for loss of his wife's services.
7 4
The brief opinion in the companion case, Becker v. Schwartz,
held that the parents' claims for expenses and loss of consortium, and
the infant's claim for pain and suffering should stand, except for
mental distress damages.7 5 The court relied solely on Park, but did
69. The most recent statement of New York law on negligent misrepresentation,
albeit in the context of accountant's liability, was given in White v. Guarante, 43 N.Y.2d
356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977):
[G]enerally a negligent statement may be the basis for recovery of damages,
where there is carelessness in imparting words upon which others were expected
to rely and upon which they did act or failed to act to their damage, but
such information is not actionable unless expressed directly, with knowledge
or notice that it will be acted upon, to one to whom the author is bound by
some relation of duty, arising out of contract or otherwise, to act with care if
he acts at all.
Id. at 362-63, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
70. 60-A.D.2d at 84, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
71. Id. at 85, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
72. 53 A.D.2d at 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462. See note 49 & accompanying text
supra.
73. 60 A.D.2d at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
75. 60 A.D.2d at 587-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 119-20.
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not attempt to distinguish Howard v. Lecher or Karlsons v. Guerinot,
and did not explain how the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction
used to justify the Parks' awards applied in Becker76
2. Emotional Distress Damages. On the basis of Howard v. Lecher,
the Park court reversed the trial court's holding that the mother's
mental distress was also a direct and foreseeable result of misrepresenta-
tion.1 7 Inasmuch as the majority had just determined that the situa-
tion was "strikingly different" from that in Howard, 7  reliance on
Howard without further analysis seems inapposite.79
The misrepresentation issue in Park presents a much stronger
case for a compensatory award for emotional harm than did the situa-
tion the closely divided court of appeals faced in Howard.80 Although
the Park court correctly summarized New York law on emotional
harm, their application of the standard is somewhat confusing. Quoting
the court of appeals in Howard, the majority stated:
It is a fixed principle of tort law that, "where a party's negli-
gence is directly responsible for physical injury to another, there is no
question but that the injured party may recover both for the actual
physical injury sustained and for the concomitant mental and emo-
tional suffering which flow as a natural consequence of the wrong-
ful act.8 '
Since the majority held that Mrs. Park's alleged physical injuries
were legally sufficient to constitute a valid claim for physical pain and
suffering resulting from the breach of duty,8 2 it is unclear how her
emotional injuries were any less a natural consequence of the tortious
act. However, the majority held: "Specifically excluded from recovery
under the parents' cause of action ... are damages flowing from mental
distress . . . owing to the inability to calculate damages, and the
absence of duty."
8 3
76. Id. Justices Titone and Hopkins reluctantly concurred, feeling restrained by
the majority holding in Park, but preserved their objections that neither the parents
nor child could establish damages and that recognition of these claims would "cause
the courts to enter a field having no sensible or just stopping point." Id. at 88, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 120.
77. Id. at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
78. Id. at 85, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
79. Park's reliance upon Howard would be more appropriate in a nonfeasance
situation such as Becker v. Schwartz.
80. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
81. 60 A.D.2d at 85, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364).
82. Id. at 85-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
83. The fourth department's decision in Karlsons v. Guerinot is a better reasoned
approach to this problem. See text accompanying notes 59-65 supra.
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This reasoning is inconsistent with the recognition of the parents'
other claims. While the majority may have felt that the specter of un-
limited liability and spurious claims required a limitation of liability
on policy grounds, following the rationale of Howard,s4 both these
policy considerations and the legal objections which were articulated to
justify this holding do not apply to the Parks' situation. The class of
potential plaintiffs is appropriately circumscribed by the duty found to
exist between the Parks and their obstetricians., The Park majority
determined that "it is only the parents, and not any third party, who
would foreseeably rely on the advice of the physician whether to have the
baby."' 6 Policy considerations aside, the practical evaluation of Mrs.
Park's emotional suffering would be no more speculative than the
practice routinely used in New York.8 7 The appellate division's treat-
ment of the Parks' mental distress claims should be re-examined.
Since the Park court recognized Mrs. Park's claim for physical injuries,
and the emotional distress stemmed from the same breach of duty, the
Parks' claims appear valid under the rule of Johnson, or under the
earlier New York "physical impact" rule.s8
B. The Infant's Claim
1. The Majority: A Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy. Al-
though the Park court acknowledged that previous wrongful life claims
by infant plaintiffs had invariably failed because of a judicial reluc-
tance to find a legally cognizable injury, the difficulties associated with
determining damages, and public policy objections, 0 the majority
chose not to address these barriers but instead announced that it
would not be constrained by precedent:
[C]ases are not decided in a vacuum; rather, decisional law must
keep pace with expanding technological, econ6mic and social change.
Inherent in the abolition of the statutory ban on abortion ... is a
public policy consideration which gives potential parents the right,
84. 60 A.D.2d at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (citations omitted).
85. Although the majority did not articulate this argument, it was raised in
Justice Titone's concurring opinion. 60 A.D.2d at 94-95, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 118. See
also note 82 supra.
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961);
W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 327-35.
87. 60 A.D.2d at 87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
88. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 81-82, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938-39 (4th
Dep't 1977). See note 65 supra.
89. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
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within certain statutory and case law limitations, not to have a
child. 0
Unfortunately, the justification for recognizing the infant's claim
relied more upon confusing the infant's and parents' causes of action
than on a reasoned analysis. The court did not make the necessary con-
nection between the misrepresentation infringing upon the parents
rights, and the child's right to recover on his own behalf. The parents
will presumably be compensated for the tortious violation of their
rights by the vindication of their claims.
While most jurisdictions have only recently recognized that the
two classes of plaintiffs follow different theories of recovery, the Park
majority continued:
[The parents' right not to have a child] extends to instances in which
it can be determined with reasonable medical certainty that the child
would be born deformed. The breach of this right may also be said
to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a
whole, functioning being.91
The rhetorical creation of a fundamental right to be born a whole,
functioning being is an unnecessarily broad and potentially dangerous
'extension of the court of appeals' dicta in Endresz v. Friedberg,
2
where the court refused to recognize a cause of action for prenatal
wrongful death. Certainly the majority did not mean to suggest that
the infant's claim against the physician was of constitutional magni-
tude. One implication of such a characterization is that claims could be
prosecuted against attending doctors, hospitals, parents, the state, or
others each time an infant is dissatisfied with his physical or mental
state. Although not at issue in this case, this rationale also suggests a
right to be born perfect.9 8
90. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (citations omitted).
91. Id,
92. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969). The Endresz court
distinguished Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), which
recognized an infant's cause of action upon birth for prenatal injuries directly caused
by the defendant, by stating that Woods merely "brought the common law of [New York]
into accord with the demand of natural justice [by requiring] recognition of the legal
right of every human being to begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects
resulting from the negligence of another." 24 N.Y.2d at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
93. The New York Court of Appeals has indicated its reluctance to begin the
process of determining what circumstances of birth are sufficiently egregious to result
in a legally cognizable damage. In Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 181, 223 N.E.2d 343,
276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1955), a wrongful status case, the court stated that "[b]eing born
under one set of circumstances rather than another . . . is not a suable wrong that is
cognizable in court." Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887. While the
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Park's rationale for recognizing the infant's cause of action is
deficient in two respects. The court did not explain how Lara Park's
injuries could be handled within a legally valid scheme of compensa-
tion; instead the court ignored the problem of damages. While the
court held that public policy was not a bar to the infant's claim, the
court's broad justification did not indicate how the boundaries of this
new liability could be established, and implies that the liabilities may
not be proportionate to the defendant's culpability.
2. The Dissent: A Traditional View of Wrongful Life. Justice
Titone saw the result not as one of keeping pace with social change,
but rather as "rushing into the adoption of a radical social concept
having no basis in law, namely, that there may be suable wrong stem-
ming solely from the existence of life."9' Questioning the majority's
reasoning that the legalization of abortion justified the recognition of
the wrongful life claim in Park, he noted that the instant claims were
based not on the right to an abortion, but on the parents' right not to
conceive a child.
It is the understatement of the ages to observe that the choice of
parents to conceive or not to conceive antedated the 1970 change in
the law prohibiting abortions, and that no right to recover damages
for having been conceived and born rather than never to have been
conceived or born was known at common law.9 ;
Reasoning by analogy to the history of wrongful death claims,90 the
dissent felt that recognition of claims "predicated on the premise that
a life has evolved which should not have evolved" 97 was a legislative
rather than a judicial function. Justice Titone concluded that none of
the plaintiffs could establish legally cognizable damages; therefore none
of the claims stated a legally valid cause of action.
illegitimacy in Williams may be distinguishable from the debilitating defects in Park,
recognition of the infant plaintiffs' claims will require that the courts begin to make
such evaluations.
94. 60 A.D.2d at 90, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115-16 (Titone, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 90, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
96. Wrongful death claims were not cognizable at common law, largely due to
reliance on one English decision:
[I]n 1808 Lord Ellenborough, whose forte was never common sense, held with-
out citing any authority that a husband had no action for loss of his wife's
services through her death, and declared in broad terms that "in a civil court
the death of a human being could not be complained of as injury."
W. PROSSR, supra note 21, at 901-902. (quoting Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 170
Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808)).
97. 60 A.D.2d at 91, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
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V. THE CONCEPTUAL BARRIER: Is BIRTH A LEGALLY
COGNIZABLE DAMAGE?
The major legal objections to recognizing the infant's cause of
action relate to the infant's damages. Compensatory damage awards
are designed to mitigate loss,98 and courts have held -that it is impossible
to determine whether the infant has suffered loss in the wrongful
life situation, as well as to assess the extent of his injury. The conven-
tional conception of loss or injury relies on a comparison of 'the plain-
tiff's situation before and after the tort.99 Courts have held that life
with severe defects cannot be compared with nonexistence, because it
is impossible to weigh or to evaluate the state of nonbeing.100 Thus the
infant's situation cannot be evaluated within the legal framework of
compensatory damages, and the infant cannot establish damages as a
matter of law.
Most recent commentary, 101 and by implication, -the Park majority,
suggest that these difficulties are not controlling and that the infant's
claim can be handled within the traditional damages framework. There
is clearly a difference in the infant's position before and after the tort
98. D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at §§ 1.1, 3.1.
99.
The concept [of damages] derives from a comparison of the present position
of the victim with his position before the injurious event (or had it not
occurred) . . . . Even when considering non-material damage, such as an
attack on someone's reputation, or the causing of pain, sorrow, etc. the assess-
ment is basically always by comparison: the previous position, namely the
ideal state of the injured person were it not for the damage, and the worsened
position in which he finds himself as a result of the act for which the tort-
feasor is responsible.
In our case, however, no comparison is possible since were it not for the
act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff
cuts from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to
prove his damage.
Tedeschi, supra note 2, at 529. Other commentators have attempted to distinguish
Tedeschi's arguments by noting that he treated only wrongful status claims in his
analysis:
It is the function of the jury to determine whether the plaintiff is in a position
less preferable to death. Although one might naturally prefer to be a legitimate
child, a plaintiff would have considerable difficulty convincing a jury that he
would be better off dead. Thus, in Williams and Zepeda, the claims could be
properly dismissed on the ground that no damage was suffered. It is con-
ceivable, however, that a point could be reached under which a handicapped
life is no longer preferable to nonexistence.
Comment, Busting the Balloon, supra note 14, at 240.
100. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart
v. Long Island College Hosp., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972).
101. See, e.g., Kashi, supra note 6; Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life":
(A Suggested Analysis), 55 MINN. L. Rav. 58 (1970); 76 COLUm. L. Rav. 1187 (1976).
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upon which a comparison could be based. The only commentary cited
by the Park majority'02 stated: "only if such 'before' and 'after' vari-
ables did not exist could it be said that 'the factual situation does not
conform to the framework for determining damages .... ."103 The
infant plaintiff's problem is then reduced to whether it is possible to
make the necessary comparison by assigning values to nonexistence as
opposed to life with deformities.
By refusing to recognize an infant's damages, the courts may have
interjected their own implicit notions of the values of the respective
states into the damages calculation: since life is better than nonexis-
tence, life with defects has a positive value compared to nonexistence,
and no harm has occurred.
0 4
Leaving aside religious and moral notions of the value of life, in
cases such as Park and Becker where it is unclear that the child is
"better off" alive than never born, the following scheme has been sug-
gested to determine injury:
Life without defects = a plus value ( +)
Nonexistence = 0
Life with defects = a minus value (-)
Such an analysis assumes that life without defects is the most desirable,
but that in certain situations it would be preferable not to exist rather
than to endure life incapacitated by severe physical and mental de-
fects. Once the relative plus, minus and zero values have been estab-
lished, a compensatory figure could be ascertained by the court. This
would be no more difficult than placing a monetary value upon the
difference between living with two arms as compared with living with
only one-when the other has been severed due to the negligence of
the defendant. 0 5
Following this rationale, evaluation of the infant's pain and suffering
would be no more difficult than the process routinely used in personal
injury cases. 106
While the relational aspect of the damages calculus is present in
the wrongful life situation, as the fourth department noted in Karlsons
v. Guerinot, the flaw in this reasoning is that it ignores the funda-
mental question: whether life with defects can or should be compared
with nonexistence. Rather than providing some criteria for approach-
102. Note, supra note 101, cited in 60 A.D.2d at 87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
103. Note, supra note 101, at 64.
104. Id. at 65.
105. Id. at 66.
106. See generally, D. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 8.
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ing the definition of loss, thus marking the boundaries of liability,
this analysis answers instead the question of whether the trier of fact
could arrive at some figure for the infant's award, a question which
cannot be seriously disputed.
This line of argument further assumes than the infant's claim is
within the framework of the traditional theory of tort damages.
107
This supposition seems necessary to surmount the "lack of precedent"
and "legislative function" objections that are invariably raised along
with the damages problems, in order to allow the court to send the issue
of damages to -the jury as a question of fact. Is the premise that the
infant's claim is within -traditional or common law damages theory
demonstrably correct?
Consider the infant plaintiff's position before and after the wrong-
ful life tort in contrast with three commonly recognized injuries:
Wrongful Personal Prenatal Wrongful
Death Injury Tort Life
Status quo Life (+) Life (+) Life (+) Nonexistence (?)
(before tort) two arms normal
Damage, Death(-) Life: (-) Life: (-) Life: (?)
Harm or one arm with de- with defects
Loss (after fects
tort)
The traditional damages calculus relies on a difference in before and
after situations and also embraces concepts of the valuation of the
respective situations. However, as the chart illustrates, in a traditional
claim life is the sine qua non of the concept of damage.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Park majority's "funda-
mental right to be born ,healthy" is that it gives nonexistence the same
status that life occupies in the traditional compensatory scheme. While
the infant can show that he is in a different situation than 'he was in
before the tort, it is difficult to know what value to place upon his
"damage," or upon his "undamaged" state of nonbeing, since the usual
starting point, a normal life, is not a possibility given the factual con-
text of the wrongful life claim. The position that the infant's claim is
comparable to a personal injury award in a multilation context is based
on a dubious analogy. Although life with one arm seems comparable to
life with physical or mental disabilities, and both might be defined as
damage as the term is commonly understood, it is unclear how the
starting points are comparable.
107. See, e.g., Note, supra note 101.
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The Park trial court attempted to distinguish the unfavorable
precedents denying infants' claims by relying on a dichotomy supposedly
created because the tortious misrepresentation occurred prior to con-
ception, and because the measure of damages claimed by Lara Park
had not been specifically denied in the previous wrongful life cases:
"The infant decedent does not seek damages for being born, per se,
but rather seeks damages for the pain and suffering suffered by her
after birth based upon the tort created prior to conception."108 Al-
though the attempt to distinguish the prior cases based on a precon-
ception tort dichotomy is not relevant,109 Justice Coholan, concurring
with the second department majority on the infant's claim, also rea-
soned that Lara Park's claim was "not a claim for wrongful life, but
rather for conscious pain and suffering caused by the negligence of the
defendant doctors."" 0
The attempt to re-characterize the infant's claim as merely a tradi-
tional case requiring a pain and suffering award is not totally con-
vincing. This reasoning assumes that the compensatory damages ob-
jections can be circumvented by using a different formula for assessing
injury."' The methods of calculating damages should be flexible, but
the problem of assessing the damage is less important than the ante-
cedent question of whether the infant has suffered a legally cognizable
injury.
While the Park and Becker complaints seek damages for the in-
fants' pain and suffering and not for a lump sum award to compensate
the infants for their physical and mental handicaps, the underlying
"injury" is the same in either context.
Park's validation of the infant's claim apparently assumes that the
trier of fact will arrive at a figure for the infant's pain and suffering
by comparing the plaintiff's condition with the position of a normal
child. This method of assessing damages raises questions of equity to
the defendants, for the defendants are then held liable as if their con-
duct caused the genetic or environmental factors which caused the
108. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d at 229, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
109. Courts that have recently faced the issue of preconception torts have held
that the timing of the tort is not critical, by analogy to the widespread recognition of
prenatal torts. See generally Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab., Inc., 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973); Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App.
3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976); Note, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Uncon-
ceived, 48 U. CoLo. L. Rlv. 621 (1977).
110. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
111. In general, the formula for measuring damage can be varied according to
what is appropriate in the situation. D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at 7.
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deformities. This theory of liability is inconsistent with the facts of
Park or Becker. The only manner in which the Park defendants
"caused" Lara Park's pain and suffering was by misrepresenting the
probability of birth defects, with the result that Lara was born-the
essence of a wrongful life claim."12 Thus the infant's award must be
disproportionate to the defendant's culpability. Such a "compensatory"
award challenges notions of tort liability based upon fault.
CONCLUSION
Considering the difficult legal and philosophical issues raised in
Park and Becker, the court of appeals' evaluation of the policy con-
siderations involved will probably be determinative. The traditions
that tort law will provide compensation -for all substantial harms an
innocent victim has suffered 118 and that difficulties in determining
damages should not result in immunity from -the consequences of
negligence"x4 suggest that the court should fashion a remedy for the
infant. The deterrence rationale of fault-based liability implies That it
would be socially desirable to hold the defendants responsible for
the damages directly resulting from their actions,"5 since only the
defendants are in the position ,to prevent defective births by the proper
exercise of medical expertise. Recognition of liabilities beyond that
now imposed for pecuniary damages would provide an additional mea-
sure of deterrence.
However, a tradition of equally long standing- damnum absque
injuria-is predicated on the knowledge that it is not wise to socialize
all injuries-a concern that seems particularly acute in the medical
malpractice area. The strained characterization of the parents' claims
for mental distress damages in Howard v. Lecher may reflect the court
112. Justice Titone compared the complaints in Stewart, Greenberg v. Kiot, 47
A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975) (mem.), and Park, and found them to be sub-
stantially identical. 60 A.D.2d at 93, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
113. W. PRossER, supra note 21, at 6.
114.
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of
the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of funda-
mental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and
thereby relieve the wrong-doer from making any amend for his acts.
Story Parchment Paper Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
115. The New York Legislature has recognized the social cost of defective children
and has taken limited steps to reduce these costs. "Occurrence of malformation or in-
herited disease at the time of birth is a tragedy for the child, the family, and the com-
munity .... " N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2730 (McKinney Supp. 1977). See also N.Y.




of appeals' judgment that liability in these cases should be limited to
out-of-pocket costs.
Insofar as the Park court recognized the pecuniary elements of
the parents' damage, the Park holding is firmly based in traditional
tort theories of cost-shifting116 and enterprise liability.11 7 However,
the rationales for denying the parents an opportunity to prove their
emotional suffering damages, and for recognizing the infant's claim are
not as well reasoned.
It is likely that the underlying justification behind the Park
court's recognition of the infant's claim is the perceived inability of
the court to award the parents adequate compensation for their in-
juries, due to an overly broad reading of the Howard v. Lecher
holding as precluding an award of emotional distress damages to the
Parks. On a practical level, an award for the parents' emotional dis-
tress would serve the same purpose as the award to the infant for pain
and suffering, without raising the difficult problems inherent in the
infant's claim. If the basic problem is one of inadequate compensation
to the parents for the tortious violation of their rights, logic suggests
that the court of appeals should re-evaluate its position on the non-
pecuniary elements of damage for parents in the wrongful life situa-
tion.
The court of appeals might recognize the infant's claim for con-
scious pain and suffering. However, the court should define the limits
of this new liability, because the appellate division holdings leave
critical questions unresolved.
Medical practitioners will undoubtedly want the court to further
define the duties of genetic counselling, as two interpretations are now
possible. The Park holding could be narrowly construed as imposing
liability only in cases where the defendants have provided incorrect
genetic information in response to a patient's request. In contrast,
Becker suggests that an affirmative duty to investigate genetic and en-
vironmental factors and to inform the parents of the results is now
an element of the professional standard of care.
Although in Park the extent of liability for the infant's pain and
suffering would be limited by the infant's relatively brief life, the
Becker child's award would be limited only by the jury's conception
116. See generally 0. HOLMEs, TirE CoMmoN LAw 67-72 (1963 ed.).
117. See generally Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U.
COL. L. REv. 153 (1976); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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of adequate compensation for a lifetime with severe mental and physi-
cal disabilities. Such an award would dwarf the actual support expenses,
would result in a catastrophic loss to the defendants, and may be grossly
disproportionate to their culpability.
HARRY F. KLoDowsKI, JR.

